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Abstract 
Purpose 
This paper considers the merits of using projects bonds to finance infrastructure investment 
projects and considers the pricing of such bonds and the level of risk premium demanded by 
the market. 
Design/methodology/approach 
The research used a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods with desk based study and 
interviews. Interviews were held with policy makers, local authority staff, planners, 
developers, investors, fund managers and academics. Infrastructure bond data was obtained 
from the Bloomberg1 database on all project bonds issued in four Asian countries -Malaysia, 
China, Taiwan and India - over the period 2003 to 2014.  
Findings 
The analysis indicates investor appetite for project bonds and suggests that a risk premium of 
between 150 to 300 basis points over the comparable government bond is appropriate 
depending on the sector and the degree of government involvement in underwriting the 
issue.   
Practical implications 
The paper argues that the introduction of project bonds would be an important innovation, 
assisting the financing of infrastructure investment at a time when bank lending is likely to 
remain fragile. The current conditions in the sovereign debt market, where strong demand 
has forced down yields, has opened up the opportunity to introduce project bonds offering a 
higher yield to satisfy institutional investment demand for long term fixed income products.   
Originality/value 
The originality of this paper stems from the analysis of the merits of using projects bonds to 
finance infrastructure investment projects, the pricing of such bonds and the level of risk 
premium demanded by the market. 
Keywords 
Infrastructure, finance, project bonds, risk premium, institutions, investment.  
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1.  Introduction  
Cost estimates project global infrastructure requirements at more than US$50 trillion over 
the next 25 years, with emerging countries including China and India at the forefront of 
infrastructural modernisation which is intended to project their economies into global 
leadership positions (Urban Land Institute/ Ernst & Young, 2010).  The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) series of reports entitled ‘Infrastructure to 
2030’ highlight the growing global need for infrastructure investment and conclude that the 
task will run beyond the capacity of national governments alone and that the private sector 
has an important role to play in funding the development of essential services (Adair et al., 
2011).  
 
The scale of the challenge in financing infrastructure development allied with capital budget 
constraints has meant that the appetite for innovative finance instruments has gained 
considerable momentum. According to Strickland (2013), the need for international finance 
and development is a consequence of the economic crisis, which has resulted in reduced 
inward income of public sector funds. Most OECD countries have reduced public expenditure 
in an attempt to curb public debt, resulting in budget cuts (Merk et al., 2012). Consequently 
there has been a reduction in traditional funding routes for infrastructure and regeneration 
development projects and a clear need to explore alternative routes (Strickland, 2013).  
 
Bonds are one possible alternative option for funding infrastructure and their applicability is 
the focus of this paper. Bond financing has the potential to be particularly desirable given the 
current economic climate where global savings rates are high (the ‘global savings glut’ 
described by Bernanke, 2005), access to conventional financing vehicles for sizeable public 
projects is restricted, while demand for development is firmly on the rise. The paper therefore 
investigates whether the effective use of infrastructure bonds would facilitate the matching 
of available savings with demand for infrastructure finance.  
 
The provision of modern infrastructure is often the precursor to successful property 
development.  While traditionally the financing of infrastructure has not been viewed as a 
main stream real estate issue and has not received much coverage in the literature, this would 
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appear to be an omission as the construction of roads, railways and airports and the provision 
of utilities, such as electricity, gas, water, telecoms and sewerage are enablers of property 
development schemes and underpin their success. To understand the most efficient way for 
this infrastructure to be financed seems to be an important consideration for both the real 
estate and finance industry across the world. Real estate alternatives are a growing field of 
interest for investors and infrastructure is part of the alternatives sector. Traditionally 
investment in real estate has been in the form of equity, but bond investment is worthy of 
detailed consideration. 
 
In the UK, there has been devolution of financial power from central to local government 
presented as an aspect of the localism agenda with increasing financial responsibility passed 
onto local government. This shift can be viewed as an opportunity for local authorities to use 
innovative financial instruments, such as Tax Incremental Financing (TIF), as they become 
more financially autonomous (Hutchison et al., 2012). The restructuring of financial 
responsibility has driven increased participation of private actors in real estate development 
and “more innovative and entrepreneurial modes of infrastructure provision” (Strickland, 
2013, p.387). However in the UK, Regional Development Agencies previously “tasked with 
shaping innovation policy below national level” were disbanded after the 2010 Conservative-
led coalition government came to power and replaced with Local Enterprise Partnerships, 
which continue to be unfunded with the majority of the RDA functions (inward investment, 
sector leadership, business support, access to finance, innovation) being lead at a national 
level instead of by the LEPs (Crowley, 2011).  
 
The London Development Partnership’s Private Finance Working Group report ‘London’s 
Leverage’, identified that the challenge is not to increase availability of public financing for 
development; rather it is to stimulate private finance (Carter, 2006). According to Carter 
(2006) changes to the investment process in the UK is welcomed and much needed with 
increased flexibility and innovation, both important aspects for attracting private sector 
investment in infrastructure. However industry organisations, such as the British Property 
Federation (2008), suggest that new funding mechanisms in England and Wales such as the 
Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) are insufficient to finance infrastructure in areas that 
urgently need regeneration. 
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Against this background of the perceived need to attract alternative funding for infrastructure 
and regeneration development projects, the research presented in this paper has two clear 
aims. First, to consider the merits of using bond finance to fund specific infrastructure 
investment projects, hereafter known as project bonds. Second, to consider the pricing of 
project bonds and the level of risk premium demanded by the market, based on evidence 
from selected countries.  The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides background 
on the bond market and institutional investment requirements. Section 3 explains the 
methodology adopted in the research while Section 4 details the results of the interviews and 
of the analysis of project bonds in selected countries.  Section 5 offers conclusions and 
recommendations. 
 
2. Innovative Finance, Institutional Investment and Project Bonds  
Within Europe there is a momentum for cities to generate new initiatives to help leverage 
private sector finance for infrastructure and real estate development, as well as meet the 
increasing demand for modern communications and services (Siemens, 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers and Berwin Leighton Paisner, 2014). Moreover, from the public 
sector there has been a greater use of financial instruments and mechanisms within the 
European Union budget between 2007 and 2013 (Spence et al., 2012). Innovative finance has 
gained international significance with promotion at both global and European levels (Sandor 
et al., 2009). The World Bank broadly defines innovative finance for real estate development 
as involving non-traditional forms of funding through private mechanisms, solidarity 
mechanisms, public-private partnerships mechanisms and catalytic mechanisms (Grishankar, 
2009). However, innovative finance for infrastructure development is not to be viewed as an 
alternative to traditional forms of finance, but should been seen as complementary. The 
European Union (EU) defines innovative financing as those measures providing financial 
support to address one or more policy objectives through the use of loans, guarantees, equity 
or quasi-equity investment, or other risk-bearing tools – that can be combined with grants 
and involve risk-sharing with financial institutions to boost investment in large infrastructure 
projects. (Spence et al., 2012). Bond instruments thus fall within the possible mix of funding 
opportunities. 
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To place UK institutional bond investment in context, the last 50 years has witnessed a shift 
in the proportion of institutional money in fixed income investments (Adair, 2007). In the 
early 1960s pension funds allocated over 50% of their assets in bonds and this fell steadily 
until 1993 to a low of 10%. Since 1994, the proportion has been on a rising trend, with the 
figure around 40% in 2013 (UBS, 2013) and there appears to be a continuing appetite for long 
dated bonds, both from those unsettled by equity market volatility and those seeking to 
match long term debt to long term cash flow. 
 
There are many examples of bonds having been used to finance major public sector 
development schemes most notably in the UK, the £5.2 billion Channel tunnel rail link where 
the government agreed to guarantee £3.75 billion of debt issued by London and Continental 
Railways (Bayley, 2003). Indeed, the use of bonds in the infrastructure phase of development 
was promoted in an Investment Property Forum (IPF)) sponsored research project in 2006 
that investigated the necessary conditions for institutional investment in regeneration (IPF, 
2006, Adair et al., 2007).  
 
The necessary conditions for institutional investment in project bonds and the appropriate 
legal structure need to be understood. First, it is important to recognise that the bond market 
is global and institutional investors are sensitive to legal, political and regulatory risks and 
seek jurisdictions with a robust legal framework and minimum government interference in 
pricing or regulation, to prevent instability in the market and the prospect of volatility in 
capital value. It is argued that investors are reassured by a well-functioning, consistent and 
predictable regulatory framework and a stable sovereign debt market, against which project 
bonds are benchmarked (Brealey et al, 1996).  
 
Second, within this framework, infrastructure bonds require the creation of a legally and 
financially self-contained entity (SPV) against which all contracts are written and the 
distribution of risk and return formally agreed. According to Ehlers et al. (2014) this type of 
debt finance is normally non–recourse with the default risk based on the specific project 
viability and not on the creditworthiness of the corporation, which would be the case with 
corporate bonds. Once infrastructure projects reach the post construction phase and move 
into the operational phase with stable cashflows, the projects become relatively 
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straightforward fixed income securities. Ehlers et al. (2014) found that where default does 
occur, the recovery rate on infrastructure bonds is higher than with defaulted corporate debt. 
In part this may be because infrastructure projects tend to be high profile with the potential 
for government support should difficulty arise and partly because default may occur earlier 
in infrastructure bonds with less chance of the project having depreciated, thus aiding 
recovery.  The legal structure, risk/return balance and sector directly impacts on the level of 
risk premium demanded by the market and this along with default rates will be analysed later 
in Section 4. 
 
Institutional investors are attracted to bonds due to the matching of long-term debt to long-
term cash flows of the project. In considering a bond, investors seek inflation hedging, some 
form of additional income appropriate to the risk profile (which maybe low if government or 
local authority backed), a level of security, long term cash flow, a degree of liquidity and low 
correlation with other asset classes (Hutchison et al., 2011). As the risk premium for project 
bonds is a margin over government issued stock it is important to understand the volatility 
surrounding the sovereign debt market since 2008. In the period post the Global Financial 
Crisis (GFC), the Gross Redemption Yield (GRY) on UK gilts fell sharply as investors fled to the 
safety of government issued stock. For example, the GRY on two year conventional gilts fell 
from 5.77% to 0.96%, from June 2007 to March 2010, while 10 year gilt yields fell from 5.46% 
to 3.9% over the same period - the lowest level for at least 30 years. Over the period 2007 to 
2010, the yields on all maturities of gilts - short, medium and long - fell sharply but with 
different degrees of volatility (Hutchison et. al., 2011). In June 2015 the GRY on two year 
conventional gilts was 0.60%, with the GRY on 10 year gilts at 2.10% - historically low levels. 
 
However, in the UK (and in some major countries in Western Europe) the relatively low level 
of current gilt yields poses a dilemma for investors who believe that the current market is not 
‘normal’.  In May 2015, the Governor of the Bank of England suggested that UK inflation is 
likely to climb above 1% by the end of 2015 (Bank of England, 2015) and there is an 
expectation that gilt yields are going to rise over the next five years as the economy recovers, 
allowing the Government to taper their QE programme. Such a yield shift will result in a fall 
in capital value on an asset, which is traditionally classified as low risk, forcing investors to 
question their level of exposure to gilts. This scenario presents a window of opportunity for 
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discrete, low correlation vehicles, offering a higher level of income return for those investors 
prepared to accept a higher level of risk.  
 
Up to the early 1990s, commercial real estate offered investors a 25 year FRI lease with 5 
yearly upward only rent reviews and was a particularly attractive opportunity for institutional 
investors seeking stable, long term income return. However, if the last 30 years has seen a 
gradual decline in the gilt yield, the same time period has witnessed some significant 
structural changes in the UK commercial market. For example, average lease length has fallen, 
holding periods have reduced and break clauses are now common. The UK Lease Events 
Review (2014) published by the British Property Federation, Strutt & Parker & IPD reported 
that the average lease length of all new leases in 2014 (unweighted) was 6.8 years, with less 
than 7% of leases over 10 years in length, compared to 20% 10 years ago. Overall around 30% 
of leases have break clauses. This reduction in lease length has occurred over a period when 
the demand for long term income stream has remained constant and investors are looking 
for alternative investments to replace the 25 year cash flow offered previously by the 
commercial real estate market. Thus at the present time, as result of the ‘non-normal’ market 
conditions in the gilt market combined with the changing investment characteristics of the 
commercial real estate market, there is an opportunity to satisfy investment demand for long 
term income products by introducing some form of infrastructure or development bond.  
 
Infrastructure or property development debt is viewed as a sub sector of the main debt 
market and is seen as distinct entity in its own right – an uncorrelated asset class with the 
possibility of stable, predictable cashflows. The main risk to the cashflows is a specific risk, 
and relates to the characteristics of the individual project and sector. There are a range of 
options along the risk curve with some projects viewed as low risk, such as government 
regulated utilities with built in RPI (Retail Price Index)/CPI (Consumer Price Index) uplifts, 
through to, for example, the transportation sector, where cashflow could be exposed to 
traffic sensitivities and onto relatively high risk real estate development in regeneration 
projects (Adair et al, 2007). In that respect investors seeking a decent level of diversification, 
need to know which part of the infrastructure or development market they are involved with 
and require understanding of the specific risk sensitivities and whether or not there are any 
government guarantees. For example, where the infrastructure bond is used to finance say, 
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investment in utilities and the returns are government backed and RPI/CPI linked, there is 
security of income flow but no control over consumer pricing. The key downside being that 
the investor would not benefit from any general uplift in capital values as they could in a real 
estate development related project. While project issues affect the cash flow risk, the 
required return is the product of market forces. Changes to market interest rates feed directly 
through to bond pricing.  However, where investors plan to hold until redemption, price 
volatility may not be the key concern. 
 
For those involved in raising finance, the infrastructure or development bond model has 
significant appeal at a time when the tightening of the regulatory regime following Basle III 
and Solvency II has resulted in higher solvency levels and less conventional lending in the 
market (Maxted & Porter, 2014). The issuing vehicle or entity of a bond is very important. 
Whether the bond is government, local authority or corporate backed has a direct impact on 
the pricing and success of the bond issue. A bond issue guaranteed by central or local 
government would provide comfort to the investor and as governments are major winners in 
regeneration developments, it is argued that they have an interest in underwriting the risk. 
Indeed, if the local authority was underwriting the bond, the coupon payments could be 
funded out of a TIF model (Adair et al., 2011). However, it is questionable in the current 
market in the UK, where an austerity regime is in place and public sector cuts are the flavour, 
whether the UK Treasury would be willing to underwrite any further commitments. Where a 
government guarantee is not forthcoming then a bond insurance or wrapper can be bought 
and priced into the investment equation (Adair, 2007). 
 
3. Methodology 
This paper forms part of a wider research project which investigated innovative finance for 
real estate development in pan-European regeneration following the GFC. The financing of 
infrastructure emerged as a recurring theme during the research.  The research used a mix of 
qualitative and quantitative methods with desk based study and interviews.  Semi-structured 
interviews either by telephone or Skype were carried out with experts experienced in finance 
and real estate development. The selection of interviewees took the form of a snowball 
method to enhance the number of potential good quality interviewees (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2007), with respondents asked to recommend further contacts useful to the research.  The 
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method of investigation was predicated upon a ‘retroductive’ process whereby semi-
structured interviews were undertaken and the results of this process fed into the analysis 
and further questioning of other participants in the study (Naoum, 2013; Mason, 2002). The 
interviews, 17 in total, embraced policy makers, local authority staff, planners, developers, 
investors, fund managers and academics. To give the scope of interviewee institutional 
affiliation, interviews were carried out with leading relevant organisations. Institutions 
included RICS UK, RICS Brussels, Composition Capital Partners, Buildings Performance 
Institute Europe (BPIE), Consilia Capital, AEDES Dutch Association of Social Housing 
Organisations, CECODHAS Housing Europe, Battersea Power Station Development Company 
Ltd, The Commercial Real Estate Finance Council Europe (CREFC Europe), Royal Bank of 
Canada, Fédération de l'Industrie Européenne de la Construction (FIEC), British Property 
Federation (BPF), European Association for Investors in Non-Listed Real Estate Vehicles 
(INREV), LaSalle Investment Management, European Investment Bank (EIB), AMP Capital, 
Winchester Partners, Leipziger Platz Development Berlin, and Malmendier Hellriegel 
Rechtsanwälte Partnerschaft. All interviewees were at a senior level with the majority of input 
from professional roles as Directors from their respective organisations. Bias from a more 
director oriented ‘elite’ expertise and opinion was accepted, as was any snowball research 
method when further contacts were recommended from interviewees as the research 
iteratively progressed (Bryman, 2012). Despite these biases, it was believed that the greater 
informed professional expertise provided a rich qualitative understanding of the cases and 
subject matter when extracting information (Denzin and Lincoln, 2007). The survey work was 
undertaken during 2014.  
 
Infrastructure bond data was obtained from the Bloomberg2 database on all project bonds 
issued in European and Asian countries over the period 2003 to 2014 in order to make a cross-
continent comparison.  For the purpose of this analysis, 2003 was chosen as the start date, as 
data are very limited prior to this.  Also, due to the paucity of data on project bond issuance 
in Europe, a cross-continent comparison was not possible and instead the top four Asian 
countries based on the number of project bonds issued over the period 2003 to 2014 were 
selected for analysis. The countries chosen were Malaysia, China, Taiwan and India.  
                                                     
2 www.bloomberg.com 
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In the first instance the following were examined: (i) the size of the bond markets in terms of 
number of bonds issued, (ii) the composition of the markets with respect to various industrial 
sectors (namely communications, consumer discretionary, energy, healthcare, industrials and 
utilities), (iii) the over-time change in coupon rate and maturity across different infrastructure 
sectors in the sample countries.   
 
Secondly, the historical performance of the government issued bond market was examined 
in each of the selected countries over the period of 2003 to 2014. The data were obtained 
from DataStream3. Within this second stage, particular attention was paid to the temporal 
relationship between the given project bonds’ coupon rates and the GRY on government 
issued bonds. To conduct the analysis on a like-for-like basis, project bonds that had a lifespan 
of around 10 years4 were compared with 10-year government debt. Conceptually, the 
difference between the project bond’s coupon and the corresponding redemption yield on 
government issued bonds represents the risk premium demanded by the market when the 
project bond was issued. The higher the risk premium, the higher the perceived risk of the 
project bond over government issued stock. Zero-coupon bonds were excluded from the 
study due to their lack of comparability, since they do not pay coupons. In addition, a 
correlation test was performed to further scrutinise whether there was co-movement/co-
variation between a project bond’s coupon and government issued bonds. 
 
An integral part of this study was an explicit examination of the manner in which 
infrastructure projects were financed by project bonds before and after the GFC: given the 
significant drop in market interest rates and the fact that investors sought the safety of 
domestic government bonds, the authors surmise that the amount of risk premium that was 
applied to the project coupons should have adjusted correspondingly against the respective 
GRY of government-issued debts. Nonetheless, depending to a large extent on how adverse 
and persistent the impact of the crisis had on the specific country in general and the industry 
                                                     
3 www.thomsonreuters.com 
4 Given the limited number of project bonds with exact maturity of 10 years, bonds that have a lifespan 
between 9 to 11 years were also considered.  
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in particular, the project bonds might have exhibited different risk profiles reflective of the 
actual business operating environment and the cost of borrowing.   
4. Results 
Interviews 
The consensus from those interviewed was that due to the nature of the schemes any 
infrastructure/development bond would require to have a lifespan of 20 years plus. Indeed 
the shift to long-term institutional capital was seen to have become more commonplace, 
given difficult relationships with banks and restrictions on lending (interviewee 7).   
 
Given the transparent nature of the long-term fixed income market and the clear risk 
characteristics, it was argued that the pricing of such a bond would be relatively 
straightforward comprising gilts plus a risk premium. For example, given a corporate credit 
rating of single A, it was suggested that a risk premium of say 150 to 300 basis points over the 
comparable gilt may be appropriate (interviewee 17). By offering a vehicle attractive to 
private sources of finance, the need for public sector involvement is reduced along with the 
risk to the public purse. Moreover, where blended public-private finance deals are proposed 
as a solution, striking the right balance in the sharing of risk between the public and private 
sectors was perceived to be an ongoing concern (interviewee 3).  
 
While the UK Treasury may be reluctant to underwrite schemes, the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) is committed to supporting project bonds through its Project Bond Credit 
Enhancement Initiative that seeks to provide partial credit enhancement to projects in order 
to attract capital market investors (EIB, 2012; EIB, 2014). The EU is encouraging its grant 
funding to be used more efficiently, given that EU block grant funding is unlikely to increase 
in the near future.  Moreover, there is anticipation that the number of projects seeking 
finance is going to increase, especially when it was stated by one interviewee that: 
 
‘The number of projects calling for finance is going to increase significantly. So using 
the grants to leverage in additional sources of funding will be important. We’ll 
probably see EU national grants blended with EIB loan products more in the future’ 
(interviewee 1). 
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The EIB currently provides a subordinated facility to enhance the quality of the senior bonds 
and therefore increase the credit rating. For example, the Greater Gabbard5 bond issuance in 
November 2013, where the EIB’s involvement enabled the bond to be rated A3 by Moody’s, 
a notch higher than would have previously been the case without enhancement. Moreover 
the issue pricing at 125 basis points over gilts on a 19-year facility was seen to be very 
competitive and much cheaper than a bank facility which would likely have been priced at 
200 to 225 basis points (interviewee 17).  The issue was three times oversubscribed and while 
largely placed with a wide selection of the UK investor community, also attracted strong 
interest from Canadian and Euro investors, thus demonstrating the appetite for this type of 
product. Presently, the EIB Project Bond Initiative is targeted only at transport, energy, 
broadband, and information and communication technology.  
 
It was suggested that a range of different bond structures could be adopted within an 
infrastructure or development scheme. Specific bonds might be by area, project or sector - 
similar to the widening opportunities via the Tax Increment Financing (TIF) bond mechanism 
to include affordable housing (possibly social housing) as well as transport infrastructure in 
the UK, as has been experienced in the United States (Squires and Hutchison, 2014). As most 
regeneration projects are mixed use, a project specific bond might include a number of 
sectors thus providing diversification benefits. Several interviewees underlined the emerging 
demand for higher risk mixed-use bond financing. Arguments raised included: 
 
‘40% of the funds are in offices, 40% in retail and the balance of 20% spread between 
residential large blocks often mixed use and infrastructure investment (Interviewee 
14)…Increasingly the commercial developers are looking at residential or mixed use 
schemes (Interviewee 5)…Mixed-use projects will affect the financing because 
different aspects of the scheme will have different returns, risk and lease profiles. So 
for an office block in London a developer might want an institutional lease for 10 – 15 
years if they can get it, but a 5 – 10 year lease for retail because what’s right today 
                                                     
5 The Grater Gabbard Offshore Transmission project is a joint venture between Balfour Beatty and Equitix 
working with AMP Capital Investors and connects the Greater Gabbard Wind Farm to the UK grid.  
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might not be right in 5 – 10 years’ time, and this will have an effect on the financing 
structure (Interviewee 2)…In some instances the mixed-use finance model on a project 
can involve a Tax Increment Financing (TIF) element, infrastructure element, and 
largely using the security of the residential exchanges to fund the overall project’ 
(Interviewee 16). 
 
A mixed use project bond is clearly higher up the risk curve than say, a ‘utility focused’ 
infrastructure bond, and in such a scenario where a higher return is demanded, it was 
suggested that issuers may wish to consider the prospect of a participating project bond, 
where investors benefit from both an income return and a share in rental value uplift and 
capital value appreciation (interviewee 17). The UBS Participating Real Estate Mortgage Fund, 
which was launched in January 2014, is an example of how this might work (UBS, 2014). 
 
In such a participating bond, the investors would benefit from rental value appreciation and 
capital value shift, whether this was achieved through specific asset management practice 
and/or general uplift in the overall market. Uplift in value and ‘value capture’ more specifically 
is placed as important to financing via bonding mechanisms, for example it is was stated that: 
 
’People tend not to talk about value capture, but it’s going to become a very important 
funding mechanism and a way of securing advances for real estate development. It’s 
a very important mechanism, and is important to make sure there is an appreciation 
of assets and that the public sector gets its share in the uplift which is created’ 
(interviewee 1). 
 
The capital value return can only be realised following a disposal and thus for this model to 
work it requires the fund to have multiple assets and have clear liquidity events. The fund 
may well need to be of significant size to achieve this and it was proposed by the interviewees, 
that a minimum fund size of £200 million would be appropriate. 
 
The lack of liquidity of infrastructure bonds in the UK was highlighted, but it was advised that 
the majority of investors tended to hold to maturity as a matter of strategy, although that 
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may have been a consequence of the illiquid secondary market giving them no option 
(interviewee 17).  
 
It was suggested by several of the respondents that project bonds would have a pan European 
appeal. While in the UK there has been a marked shift from Defined Benefit (DB) to Defined 
Contribution (DC) pension schemes this has not been the case in continental Europe where 
there remains a large number of DB schemes.  Inflation linked project bonds were highlighted 
by one interviewee as an attractive option for institutional investors: 
 
‘Inflation linked bonds might be what investors should be looking at. If pension fund 
and insurance companies are providing the debt then as long as they are getting a 
return protected from inflation and perhaps underwritten by government then this 
should be attractive’ (Interviewee 14). 
 
Given that pension finance schemes require asset liability modelling, the project bond would 
help to match the long-term stream of liabilities. For instance, if the bond was a euro 
denominated issue, the liabilities would be currency hedged and if the coupon was RPI linked, 
would provide a perfect fit for their expected outgoings – and hence generate different levels 
of risk premium. 
Level of Risk Premium 
In order to gain insight into the effect of the subprime mortgage crisis on the use of project 
bonds, the period of analysis was divided into two sub-periods: 2003 to 2007 and 2008 to 
2014.   Table 1 below shows the overall average risk premium across all sectors, while Table 
2 provides a breakdown of background characteristics by industrial sector of the project 
bonds issued in the four Asian countries.  
 
 
 
Country Number of projects6 Average Risk Premium 
(Basis points) 
                                                     
6 Only project bonds with maturity of around 10 years were considered. 
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Years 2003-2007 2008-2014 2003-2014 2003-2007 2008-2014 2003-2014 
Malaysia 132 113 245 330 149 250 
China 58 433 491 137 190 180 
Taiwan 168 102 270 63 41 53 
India 23 29 52 160 170 165 
Table 1: Overall Average Risk Premium: 2003-2014 
 
In Malaysia, 245 project bonds were issued during the total sample period. The project bond 
market was dominated by the utilities and industrial sector, which together accounted for 
over 90% of the total project bond issuances. The average maturities of the bonds ranged 
from about 3 years for the consumer and energy sectors, to over 11 years for utilities. The 
impact of the financial crisis can be seen in the substantial fall in the average coupon of the 
project bonds post 2007. For example, the utilities sector experienced a sharp decrease in 
average coupon, resulting in a significant drop in average risk premium of individual projects 
from 295 to 149 basis points over government debt. 
 
China, said to be the most active project bond market in Asia, had 491 infrastructure projects 
funded by project bonds during the same period. The popularity of project bonds increased 
significantly post 2007 as indicated by less than 60 projects financed by bonds before 2008 
and more than 430 thereafter.  Upon closer examination, the industrial sector, utilities and 
energy were the leading market players in adopting project bonds all through the sample 
period. Contrary to the findings for other countries, China experienced a rise in both coupon 
rates and risk premiums after 2007 across all sectors, which is worthy of further investigation. 
For instance, the average coupons for industrials and utilities were 4.81% and 4.86% before 
2007, and then grew to 5.69% and 5.50% respectively thereafter. Their corresponding risk 
premiums increased from around 150 basis points to about 200 basis points during the same 
period.  
 
In the case of Taiwan, the utilities sector had been prevailing in the project bond market 
almost exclusively with over 97% total market share in terms of the number of project bonds 
issued. A significant reduction in the number of projects was observed, from 167 during the 
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first sub-period to just 95 during the second sub-period. The contraction of the project bond 
market for the utilities sector saw a slight drop in average coupon, from 2.05% to 1.72% during 
the same period. The average risk premium also fell in tandem by a small margin from 63 to 
42 basis points.  
 
India, by contrast and despite population size and demand for infrastructure development, 
has a relatively small infrastructure bond market. The utilities industry had been the largest 
project bond-issuing sector with 36 issuances during the sample period, followed by the 
industrial sector and energy. Average maturities for the different sectors ranged from 8.5 to 
11.9 years. Unlike the other three sample countries, the average coupon for all sectors in India 
had remained at a fairly stable level of around 9% pre- and post GFC, while the average risk 
premium for all sectors was around 160 basis points.  
 
The historical correlation between the projects’ coupons and the corresponding government 
bond with roughly 10-year maturity over the period of 2000-2014 for the four countries was 
also calculated (See Figure 1 to 4). We found that Malaysia has the highest correlation 
(88.20%), followed by Taiwan (82.32%) and India (74.29%). China’s infrastructure bond 
market seemed to move at a different pace from the government debt market, given the 
relatively low level of correlation between the project coupons and government bonds 
(42.93%). 
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Country Sector Number of Projects Average Maturity Average Coupon Average Risk Premium (Basis Points) 
2003-2007 2008-2014 2003-2014 2003-2014 2003-2007 2008-2014 2003-2014 2003-2007 2008-2014 2003-2014 
Malaysia Utilities 66 94 160 11.31 years 8.37% 5.64% 6.77% 295 149 258 
Energy 0 1 1 3.50 years nil 2.5% 2.5% nil nil nil 
Industrials 59 12 71 8.74 years 5.95% 4.93% 6.15% nil nil nil 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
3 6 9 3.23 years 5.57% 4.29% 4.75% nil nil nil 
Healthcare 4 0 4 5.00 years 4.66% nil 4.66% nil nil nil 
Communications 0 0 0 nil nil nil nil nil nil nil 
Overall 132 113 245 10.13 years 7.47% 5.64% 6.52% 330 149 250 
China Utilities 23 121 144 8.78 years 4.86% 5.50% 5.40% 154 202 192 
Energy 14 85 99 7.90 years 4.75% 5.74% 5.60% 113 166 151 
Industrials 19 186 205 8.00 years 4.81% 5.69% 5.61% 151 190 184 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
1 39 40 6.35 years 5.25% 6.80% 6.61% nil nil nil 
Healthcare 0 0 0 nil nil nil nil nil nil nil 
Communications 1 2 3 5.00 years 1.20% 2.90% 2.33% nil nil nil 
Overall 58 433 491 8.06 years 4.76% 5.74% 5.64% 137 190 180 
Taiwan Utilities 167 95 262 6.63 years 2.05% 1.72% 1.93% 63 42 54 
Energy 0 6 6 7.33 years nil 1.98% 1.98% nil nil nil 
Industrials 1 0 1 5.00 years 0 nil 5.00% nil nil nil 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
0 1 1 5.00 years nil 5.00% 5.00% nil nil nil 
Healthcare 0 0 0 nil nil nil nil nil nil nil 
Communications 0 0 0 nil nil nil nil nil nil nil 
Overall 168 102 270 6.63 years 2.05% 1.74% 1.94% 63 41 53 
India Utilities 16 20 36 9.63 years 8.91% 9.23% 8.93% 103 200 188 
Energy 2 1 3 8.33 years 14.38% 12.00% 13.58% nil nil nil 
Industrials 3 8 11 11.87 years 5.25% 7.52% 7.72% nil nil nil 
Consumer 
Discretionary 
0 0 0 nil nil nil nil nil nil nil 
Healthcare 0 0 0 nil nil nil nil nil nil nil 
Communications 2 0 2 8.50 years 9.12% nil 9.12% nil nil nil 
Overall 23 29 52 9.99 years 9.48% 8.87% 8.98% 160 170 165 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of project bonds of the four sample countries: 2003 to 2014
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Default Rates and Government Protection of Project Bonds 
Intuitively, project bonds tend to be more risky than those of corporate issuers primarily 
because of the inherently complex nature of construction and development, hence higher 
default rates are often presumed. However, a cross-country study on default rates of various 
bond products reveals that such preconception is not necessarily true (Moody’s, 2012).  In 
the initial phase of new projects, infrastructure bonds issued by private corporations do 
actually have a slightly higher chance to default than that of non-financial corporate bonds 
(See Figure 5). This could be largely due to unforeseeable circumstances (such as delay and 
disruption in construction) and cash flows to the projects being mostly negative. Yet, once the 
projects reach a more financially mature stage (after the fourth year on average), defaults will 
become less likely relative to other bond projects. Indeed, once government infrastructure 
bonds are taken into account, the performance of all infrastructure bonds (Total 
Infrastructure Bonds in Figure 5) is consistently better than that of non-financial corporate 
bonds throughout the bonds’ lifetime.  
 
Another reason for the project bonds’ greater stability over longer time horizons could be the 
potential government support for the investments.  For example in Malaysia, most of the local 
infrastructure bond issuers, and/or their guarantors, are government-linked corporations 
(GLC) over which the state has direct control as the majority shareholder. Furthermore, the 
majority of the GLCs have been strategically placed under the direct management of 
Khazanah Nasional, the sovereign wealth fund of Malaysia. With these added features of 
institutional backing embedded in their project structures, defaults are considerably less likely 
to occur, especially when the projects are deemed politically advantageous or sensitive.  
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Source: Moody’s Investors Service (2012) 
 
Conclusion 
The originality of this paper stems from the analysis of the merits of using projects bonds to 
finance infrastructure investment projects, the pricing of such bonds and the level of risk 
premium demanded by the market. It is evident that in most European countries post GFC, 
austerity regimes are in place and national governments alone are not able to finance the 
growing demand for major infrastructure investment. It is argued that to delay investment in 
this sector has the potential of hindering economic recovery. The need for a partnership with 
the private sector in order to raise the necessary level of capital is thus pivotal.  
 
Institutional investors are attracted to bonds due to the matching of long term debt to long 
term cashflows of the project, so there is a natural fit between supply and demand.  The use 
of bond finance to fund major infrastructure projects is not new, but the current market 
conditions in the sovereign debt market, where strong demand has forced down yields, has 
opened up the opportunity to introduce project bonds offering a higher yield to satisfy 
institutional investment demand for long term fixed income products.  This window may close 
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in the event of interest rate rises, which are expected to start to happen in the UK over the 
next 12 to 18 months.  However, in continental Europe the very low interest rate environment 
is expected to continue for much longer, due to the lack of economic growth and low levels 
of inflation and therefore the specific opportunity to introduce project bonds due to the ‘non-
normal’ market pricing of government bonds may be open for a longer period in Europe. If 
this opportunity is not to be missed, further research is needed to fully explore and 
understand institutional investor attitudes to investment in project bonds. 
 
Evidence from the interviewees and from the analysis of project bonds from the Asian 
countries (with the exception of Taiwan) would suggest that a risk premium of between 150 
to 300 basis points over the comparable gilt would be appropriate depending on the sector 
and the degree of government involvement in underwriting the issue. In the market of June 
2015 this might suggest a project bond offering a sub 5% yield.  However, in the event of the 
GRY on a UK 10-year gilt mean reverting to say 5%, the coupon demanded on a project bond 
would need to rise to 6.5%/8.00% in order to maintain the margin. For a pure income product 
an 8% coupon would be challenging and would bring into sharp focus the benefits of 
promoting a participating bond or a convertible bond to allow some trimming of the margin.   
 
Of course, interest rates may remain low for a longer period of time than is expected, but 
even if rates do rise, project bonds offer the type of long term income product that 
institutional investors require throughout the economic cycles, with the long life of the fund 
a positive advantage enabling matching of long term liabilities.  In this respect the analysis 
underpinning this paper has significance for the delivery of regeneration and infrastructure 
with the introduction of project bonds an important innovation, assisting the financing of 
investment in these key sectors at a time when bank lending is likely to remain fragile.  
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